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“What’s the difference between kinky and pervert
ed?” the tendentious joke goes: “Kinky means using
a feather; perverted means using the whole chicken.”
The satisfied laugh or groan elicited by the joke
depends on the listener’s anticipated (and, for most of
us understandable) distaste at the thought of having
sex with a chicken — either functionally or proxi
mately. But the difference between kinky and per
verse can be dangerous as well
distasteful, for the
line separating one from the other demarcates zones
of habitability: one feather is okay, but the whole
chicken is not. Jokes reinforce the line between hab
itable and uninhabitable, but depending on the time,
place, and persons involved, disrespect for that line
can turn deadly. When JoAnn Wypijewski went to
Laramie, Wyoming, after Matthew Shepard’s mur
der, she was told a different joke: “‘You can have sex
with a sheep in Wyoming, just don’t tie the shepard
to the fence’” (70). Gallows or humor?
While crossing into the zone of uninhabitability
may elicit a range of responses from laughter to exe
cution, the line that marks the exit from habitable
zones shifts with time, culture, situation, and thus is
always determined by society, by the shared under
standing of the audience. The first joke tacitly sug
gests that utilizing a chicken for sex makes body
perverted; in fact, it is not the presence or absence of
the chicken but the audience’s laughter that does so.
It is thus entirely possible for a body to cross the
threshold into abjection and not be aware of the trans
gression until the audience’s response indicates a line
has been crossed. Critical theories informed by the
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work of de Saussure, Lacan, and Foucault — work that powerfully called into
question Cartesian models of subject formation — has enabled scrutiny of these
lines, both their construction and maintenance. The language I deploy here —
"abjection,” “zones of habitability” — reveals my indebtedness to certain theo
rists engaged in this kind of scrutiny, particularly the work of Judith Butler in
Bodies that Matter, Interrogating the formation and the materiality of the sub
ject, Butler finds that the production of subjects “requires the simultaneous pro
duction of a domain of abject beings” (3). Abjection is not simply a matter of
othering, it “designates a degraded or cast out status within the terms of social
ity” (243). Today in the United States, zones of abjection include those states
of being that are cast out from the norm and that invite violent consequences:
the physically or mentally disabled body as well as the black or homosexual
body. The subject “fantasizes” that the abject constitutes a threat to its own
integrity: “I would rather die than do or be that!” (Butler 243). But the threat
is just that, a fantasy; the iteration of norms through utterances or acts (jokes
or executions) maintains that fantasy by violently casting out the threatening
body or bodies. Fortunately for those of us who live close to the fine (and I
would say that is each of us some times), critical inquiry into the economic, sex
ual, and- historical constructions of the subject has attended to how the lines
separating subject from abject are generated and sustained. However, it has not
examined closely enough its own participation in the reinforcement of those
fines. When criticism relies on the same shared understandings as the joke
about the chicken, it works to maintain those lines. One of the most damag
ing and most commonly shared understandings assumes that fear is the “nor
mal” response to abjection.
Criticism of the brief altercation between the Pardoner and the Host at the
end of Chaucer’s The Pardoners Tale provides a useful heuristic device for exam
ining such shared assumptions. In The Canterbury Tales, the Prioress’ odd
brooch and even the Friar’s cupidity, however contemptible, still fall within the
range of habitable, acceptable space. They remain in the company of pilgrims;
neither is singled out for particular castigation. Only the Pardoner crosses the
line into abjection, an excess made manifest not by his own actions but by the
Host’s vehement response. The scene I am using takes only sixty lines and
occurs almost as an afterthought to The Pardoners Tale, At the end of his tale,
the Pardoner invites the company to purchase absolution from him, either for
getting he has already revealed his game or assuming he is good enough to dupe
even these pilgrims who are aware of it. Of all the company, the Pardoner
invites the Host first: “I rede that oure Hoost heere shal bigynne / For he is
moost envoluped in synne” (lines 941-2). The Host denies the Pardoner’s offer:
“‘Nay, nay!’ quod he, ‘thanne have I Cristes curs! . . . / Thou woldest make me
kisse thy olde breech, / And swere it were a relyk of a seint, / Though it were
with thy fundament depeint!”’ (946, 948-50). The Host rightly specifies the
consequences of paying for absolution without true confession: not redemption
but “Cristes curs.” And he further exposes the Pardoner’s game. These are not
saints’ relics, but the Pardoner’s own relics, collected from wherever, possibly
even from his own ass. But the Host follows his refusal with a threat: “I wolde
I hadde thy coilions in myn hond / . . . Lat kutte hem of” (952, 954). When
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he follows his refusal with a violent threat, the Host participates in the itera
tion of a norm that works to cast out the Pardoner; the threat signifies that the
Pardoner has crossed a line, the consequences for which are violent.
The short altercation between the Host and Pardoner has received little
critical attention until recently when interest in subjectivity and abjection has
rendered the Pardoners contestable morality and sexuality irresistible. While a
number of recent studies offer intelligent, alternative explanations of what
makes the Pardoner’s offer so unpardonable, on one point they agree: the Host
threatens the Pardoner because he fears him. Yet if the scene — replete with
ambiguities and laden with emotion — begs for an analysis of its emotion, it
provides almost no information about either the Pardoner’s or the Host’s emo
tional state; thus we can never know what the Host feels. Instead of acknowl
edging the text’s silence, though, many critics interpolate their own culturally
inflected understandings of emotion into the text, a practice that is, of course,
defensible on the grounds that any act of interpretation is also an act of inter
polation, but my argument that an ethical reading will consider the implica
tions of positing one emotion over another.
A quick survey of several recent studies reveals the tendency to posit unin
terrogated assumptions about the Host’s reaction to the Pardoner: Monica
McAlpine characterizes the Host’s response as a reaction to threat (17); H.
Marshall Leicester claims that the Pardoner embodies the “horror of existence”
(44); Allen Frantzen discusses the Host’s “frightened and frightening respons
es” (144); and Carolyn Dinshaw speculates that “[p]erhaps, sensing something
of the Pardoner’s lack, the Host fears for his own manhood” (163). All of these
writers rest their logic on this notion of fear but fail to explain how they know
it fear that the Host feels. Dinshaw even acknowledges her reliance on par
ticular interpretation of the Host’s emotional state: “Harry’s response power
fully corroborates the associations I have been pointing to here” (168). The text
of the tale gives little indication of precisely what the Host feels. The only
overt mention of emotion comes at the end of the scene when the Host says he
will not “pleye” with any “angry man” (951). This refers to the Pardoner’s emo
tional state, not Harry Bailey’s, though it is just as likely that the Host responds
out of anger rather than fear. Any interpretation of the Host’s emotions would
require a justification based on careful reading and logic. Yet these writers, who
are impressively careful in their research and in the construction of their argu
ments, assume they know the Host’s emotions but refrain from providing any
evidence for those assumptions. Even if they are correct that the Host fears,
they would need either to theorize or historicize their assumptions about the
Host’s emotions. They do neither. Nor do they consider that the superlative
ly masculine Harry Bailey threatens violence out of an aggressive impulse
instead of a fearful one. As result, their arguments finally participate in and
reinforce a shared understanding that abjection provokes fear. Such a shared
understanding works to establish fear as an essential response to abjection — an
essentialization that poses the possibility of violent consequences for abjected
bodies.
The problem in attributing fear to the Host can be seen in McAlpine’s
ground-breaking
“The Pardoner’s Homosexuality and How it Matters.”

Published by eGrove, 2020


a

3


a

Journal X, Vol. 5 [2020], No. 1, Art. 7

112

Journal x

The description of the Pardoner in The General Prologue certainly contributes
to McAlpine’s interpretation of the Pardoner as a homosexual. The text indi
cates an ambivalent sexuality when the narrator conjectures that the Pardoner
is either already castrated or effeminate: “I trowe he were a geldyng or a mare”
(General Prologue 691). Where evidence of his masculinity should be — in his
lap — he has instead a fungible penis, a “male” in which he keeps his “relics.”
Thus, at the end of his tale, when the Pardoner invites the Host over to “kisse
the relikes,” he implicitly invites the Host to kiss the “male” part in his lap, an
invitation to fellatio. In case the Host should be too dull to understand such a
subtle come-on, the Pardoner ends his request by directing the Host to
“‘Unbokele thy purs,”’ inviting the Host not just to part with his money (con
tained within the purse) but to expose himself sexually (Pardoners Tale 945);
“purs” appears as a gloss for penis (specifically an instrument for sexual plea
sure) in the Wife’s prologue (44b). The Pardoner’s offer thus contains a fairly
explicit sexual invitation. While it would be wrong to ignore the sexual comeon in the Pardoner’s offer, it is equally wrong to interpret this as a scene of
homosexuality and homophobia. Allen Frantzen appropriately remarks on the
ahistorical assumptions of McAlpine’s argument: “It is not necessary to insist
that [the Pardoner] is homosexual or to identify the Pardoner as gay; to do so
to assume (without evidence) that such a category constitutes medieval iden
tity when it seems, rather, to describe acts performed by certain persons that
contributed to their identity but did not define them” (133). While it’s possi
ble that the Pardoner’s offer constitutes a threat, it is far more likely a spiritual
than a physical or sexual one.
When Monica McAlpine argues for the Pardoner’s homosexuality, she
almost assuredly does so out of concern for justice and from an antihomophobic stance. But if the Pardoner’s sexuality matters, then so does the Host’s
response. If she were right about the Pardoner, then assuming the Host
homophobic serves to establish a tradition of fearing homosexuals; the impli
cation is that people have always feared the homosexual — an essentializing
move. The danger in McAlpine’s argument lies in its perpetuation of fear as an
understood response to abjected bodies, in this case, the homosexual body.
Though Frantzen and others address other, more historically accurate readings
of the Pardoner’s abjection, they still assume the Pardoner incites fear when
they participate in a “shared understanding” that the abject is to-be-feared (just
as the guy with the chicken is to-be-laughed-at). While these readings unset
tle our understanding of medieval subjectivity, their unquestioning assumptions
about the scene’s emotional content reinforce the notion that fear the under
stood (read: approved) response to abjection.
In The Pardoners Tale and other texts, the impulse to attribute negative
responses to fear is understandable enough. In Powers ofHorror, Julia Kristeva
argues that, when “[c]onfronted with states of distress that were evoked for us
by the child who makes himself heard but is incapable of making himself
understood, we, adults, use the word Tear’” (33). In the same way, critics
attribute negative reactions in texts to fear: the child cannot articulate the cause
of distress, the text does not. As observing adults or observant readers we can
only guess, and we guess fear. While I am indebted to Kristeva’s understand
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ing of abjection for my argument, her explanation of the interrelation between
fearfulness and abjection
less useful. She asks “why is it phobia that best
allows one to tackle the matter of relation to the object? Why fear and object?”
(33). But she does not find a clear answer to her own question. Referring to
Otto Rank’s comments on birth trauma, Kristeva concludes:

Fear, therefore, in a first sense, could be the upsetting of a bio-drive balance.
The constitution of the object relation might then be a reiteration of fear,
alternating with optimal but precarious states of balance. Fear and object
proceed together until the one represses the other. But in which one of us
that fully successful?
(33-4)

The final question in the above quotation turns, the text away from an inquiry
into why fear and toward an inquiry into the machinations of fear. The two sen
tences that ought to answer the question, though, are plagued by uncertain
verbs: “Could,” “might be.” More importantly, an inquiry into why it’s fear
begs the question of whether it’s fear. When the text remains silent, neither
naming the emotions at play nor providing enough physical description to infer
the emotions (racing heart, sweating, and so on), we finally cannot know. Since
even precise physical descriptions can be misleading (“a racing heart,” or
“sweating” might just as easily describe excitement
fear), even hard evidence
becomes suspect and calls into question the possibility of interpreting emotion
at all.. What is possible, however, to examine the implications of overriding
our epistemological limitations.
In her work on abjection, Kristeva explores the interrelation between fear
fulness and abjection, but the cultural implications of interpreting emotions are
made clearer by an anthropological model that focuses on culture rather than a
psychoanalytic model that focuses on the individual subject. David Scruton, in
his anthropology of fear, Sociophobics, observes that “[f]ear
commonly
thought of as an innate human trait, the result of the species’ phylogenetic
development, something which is triggered by various stimuli and experienced
in phylogenetic terms” (9-10). However, he argues against a purely biochemi
cal-based explanation of fear; instead, he finds “biology is, in fact, nondirective”
and that emotions occur in a cultural matrix (10). Fear, he argues, is an event
like any emotion and as such is experienced within a “framework of social rela
tions” (18). This means that when we experience fear, we do so as a function
of our culture; it also means that fear has specific consequences. Scruton’s point
here has important implications for the way theorists read emotions:
It is altogether unlikely that emotions can occur, be mediated as we have
described, and have no results. On the contrary, emotions do have impor
tant consequences: they influence our behavior. They are means, in fact,
through which society accomplishes vital tasks, for they are instrumental in
encouraging conformity to significant behavioral and attitudinal norms of
that society. They provide individuals with approved and accepted response
tendencies in situations which are judged to be important.
(26)
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If the Host indeed fears the Pardoner, he does so not out of an innate response,
but as a culturally encoded event. But this would also mean that the Host —
and other medieval subjects — fear the same things we do, that they are the
products of the' same culture. Readings that assume the Host fears the Par
doner not only rely on an ahistorical understanding of abjection but further
reinforce fear of abjection as a cultural norm: it is as acceptable to laugh at the
chicken as it is to fear the abject.
Other assumptions about fear make these readings dangerous. Scruton
notes that we tend to believe fear is an innate response to dangerous situations
and triggers a flight-or-fight mechanism. Because we see fear
a means of
protection from danger, we tend also to judge less harshly the actions of a fear
ful person: if the fear response is primal, then it in some measure beyond
rational control and originates in the drive toward self-preservation. Self
defense more comprehensible, and invariably more forgivable, than aggresssion. Perpetuating an understanding that fear constitutes a culturally approved
response to abjection also perpetuates a culture in which violence against
abjected bodies is more comprehensible and thus more forgivable. When crit
icism of The Pardoners Tale focuses on the Pardoner’s abjection as an obvious
incitement to fear, it tacitly pardons the Host’s response. No one questions
whether the Host responds reasonably; they know he fears because they assume
it’s normal to fear abjection. While the Pardoner thus comes under further
scrutiny, further abjected by the writers who wish to understand him, the Host
escapes interrogation.
The implications of such criticism, or even of laughing at a chicken joke,
may not appear to invoke dire consequences. But the other joke I cite at the
beginning of this article does. In her essay on Matthew Shepard’s murder,
Wypijewski refers to the clichéd line between love and hate to argue that such
a line is kept strong by “all the little things of a culture, mostly unnoticed and
unremarked” (67). And when we notice those lines (on one side is love — or
at least its possibility — acceptance, normalcy; on the other side is hatred,
abjection, perversion), even if we notice them only to decry them, we often
reinstantiate them: “Among those who advocate hate-crime laws, it’s always
the sexuality of the victim that’s front and center, not the sexuality of the crim
inal or the everyday, undifferentiated violence he took to extremity” (73).
When the abjected body homosexual, we have a peculiar way of naming such
acts of violence — homophobia — that carries an excuse within its condemna
tion. Calling such acts “phobic” means they are rooted in fear, a fear we believe
is beyond our control and is part of our self-defense mechanism.
Both Aaron McKinney and his girlfriend, Kristen Price, wanted to rely on
a shared understanding that the abjected homosexual quite reasonably incites
homophobia and thus a violent response: “presuming homophobia to be an
acceptable alibi, [Price] thought she was helping him when she told the press
that he and Henderson just wanted to beat [Shepard] up bad enough to teach
him a lesson not to come on to straight people’” (Wypijewski 63). And
although he told the police that Shepard did not hit on him, McKinney later
wrote to someone, attempting to exonerate himself: ‘ Being a verry [sic] drunk
homophobick [sic] I flipped out and began to pistol whip the fag with my gun’”
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(63). While Wypijewski repeatedly interrogates the assumptions that enable
such violence, her essay reveals that few others in Laramie or elsewhere do.
Even the director of a program with the Southeast Wyoming Mental Health
Center attributes McKinney’s actions to fear: “‘When it’s fear or hurt, which is
typically the primary emotion at work, when you can’t say, “I’m scared shitless,”
most hurt and fear will come out in the only vehicle men are allowed. It comes
out crooked. It looks like anger, it’s expressed as anger but it isn’t’” (quoted in
Wypijewski 70). How does he know? We need to believe fear motivates such
crimes because violence rooted in fear still leaves McKinney and Russell Hen
derson as people we can in some way accept as human.
Two responses typify our reactions to the Matthew Shepard murder, the
Littleton, Colorado murders, the dragging death of James Byrd in Jaspar, Texas:
one posits the killers
afraid, the other calls them monsters. We are prepared
either to accept the crimes
understandable because the violence initiated
from a primal response or to reject these men as not fully human. Any other
explanation threatens our conception of humanity. Regardless of our respons
es, of course, they are human. But to assert that their violence originates in fear
leaves an important part of our culture unexamined. At the beginning of her
essay, Wypijewski claims, quite radically, that “[i]t’s just possible that Matthew
Shepard didn’t die because he was gay; he died because Aaron McKinney and
Russell Henderson are straight” (62). An ethical response to Matthew Shep
ard’s murder would question not only the crime, but why McKinney and oth
ers think that fear of abjection helps to explain, if not to excuse it.
This interrogation needs to occur in all readings of culture, including read
ings of literature. In January 1999, PMLA devoted an issue to ethics. While
the articles contribute to the discussion of ethics in literary studies, not one
article interrogates the cultural implications of how we read. Whether scenes
like those of The Pardoners Tale merely reveal or actively produce fear matters
less than our professional responsibility to examine the ways our reading prac
tices may participate in normalizing violent phobias. It is the interpretation,
not the creation, of the scene between the Host and Pardoner that should con
cern us because it is impossible to know what motivates the Host to react as he
does. And the gap in this text does not comprise one of the small inconse
quential gaps Wayne Booth so engagingly ridicules; this gap the unbridgeable
distance between heaven and hell, with a deadly temptation in the middle —
the temptation to assume we know what motivates others, to assume that cer
tain emotional responses are now and have always been “normal.” Which is not
to say critics should refrain from commenting on such stubborn texts, but their
commentary ought to include (or at least have considered) its own assumptions
and consequences. Sure the chicken joke funny, but what are we doing when
we laugh at it, and what are we doing when we fear the Pardoner?

I would like to thank Gary Taylor, Sheree Meyer, Sharon O’Dair, Harold
Weber, and Elizabeth Meese for their helpful editorial comments.
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